冷艾琳
Associate Professor
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A Rubinstein Bargaining Experiment in Continuous Time
  • Institution:
    经济研究院
  • Title of Paper:
    A Rubinstein Bargaining Experiment in Continuous Time
  • Journal:
    Games and Economic Behavior
  • Key Words:
    Continuous time Rubinstein bargaining Laboratory experiment
  • Summary:
    I conduct a bargaining experiment with discounting in continuous time. At any point in time, each of the two players can make a proposal. However, after making an offer, a player must wait for a specific duration of “waiting time” before she can make a new offer or accept the other’s offer. In addition, the player’s share is discounted by her discount rate for every unit of time. In the equilibrium, the agreement is reached immediately, and a player’s share increases with her waiting time and decreases with her discount rate. Results show that a longer waiting time or a lower discount rate alone increases a player’s proportion of the actual payoff, but the combination of the two factors has a weaker effect.
  • First Author:
    Ailin Leng
  • Document Code:
    678B06659DC144BDAB768951E3ADB648
  • Discipline:
    Economics
  • Volume:
    140
  • Issue:
    140
  • Page Number:
    115-131
  • Number of Words:
    10000
  • Translation or Not:
    No
  • Date of Publication:
    2023-07
  • Release Time:
    2023-11-07
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