Study on the opertaion mode of remanufacturing supply chain:who should purchase“product quality insurance”?

Release time:2020-05-21|Hits:

Journal:Operations Research and Management Science

Key Words:remanufacturing supply chain; product quality guarantee insurance; stackelberg game; operation mode; revenue sharing

Abstract:以汽车零部件制造业为研究背景,运用斯坦伯格博弈,探析了在制造和再制造双供应链寡头竞争中,采用为再制造品购买"产品质量保险"这一促销策略时,再制造供应链参与者"谁应来投保"的问题。依据集体生产者责任(CPR)理论,"投保策略"的实施模式可分为两种:(1)再制造商主导投保;(2)再制造品零售商主导投保。根据消费者行为研究,构造了反映投保策略的需求函数,并针对投保者不同,探究了两种投保模式的可取条件及其最优利润。研究表明:从整个再制造供应链效益来看,再制造商主导投保模式恒优于零售商主导投保模式;但若两种模式同时可取,再制造商及其零售商均会消极投保,以期谋求"搭便车"收益,此时再制造商可在一定范围内提高收益出让比率以促进零售商投保,否则再制造商应积极主导投保。

First Author:Shuiye Niu*,Yongjian Li

Indexed by:Journal paper

Discipline:Management Science

First-Level Discipline:Management Science and Engineering

Document Type:J

Volume:28

Issue:1

Page Number:46-53

Translation or Not:no

Date of Publication:2019-04-01