Cheap Talk in a Coordination Game
张岚，西南财经大学副教授，美国印第安纳大学博士。主要研究领域为管理经济学，博弈论等。其研究成果发表在经济学（季刊），Economic letters，Journal of Industrial Economics 等知名学术期刊。
2016年6月16日（周四）下午2:00-3:30
We introduce cheap talk communication in a coordination game with incomplete information. We show that the pre-play communication does enhance the frequency of coordination. In the most informative communication equilibrium, an infinite amount of messages are sent by each agent but perfect coordination can never be achieved. The more biased an agent is toward her preferred action, the less information is conveyed through cheap talk communication. We further analyze two mechanisms and show that a majority of the social surplus can be achieved by a two partition equilibrium relative to the most informative equilibrium and the first best when the cost of miscoordination is sufficiently low.
